Aristotle. 8 And I thought also that the moral and political philosophy shaped by Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham and their successors down to today is a series of blunders and oversights, partly but inadequately identified, and then inadequately resisted, by Kant and his successors, and partly prepared for by deficiencies in the (neo-)scholasticism of Aquinas's sixteenth-century and later successors.
Fortin seems not to have noticed the book's own statement of its program. As the preliminary Part I draws towards its close, and after more than a page expounding the errors of Gabriel Vazquez, Francisco Suarez, and later neo-scholastics about obligation, errors occasioned by their departures from Aquinas's thought, and by neglect of ends and goods, NLNR says:
The reader will ask how Aquinas explained the difference between moral thinking and merely prudential reasoning (in the modern sense of 'prudential'), and how he accounted for the peculiarly conclusory sense of the moral 'ought'. The answer must be that Aquinas's account of these matters is, at best, highly elliptical, scattered, and difficult to grasp, and at worst, seriously underdeveloped; and that these deficiencies occasioned the unsatisfactory responses of those who professed to follow him in the later history of philosophical theology. But to this I must add that the materials for a satisfactory development of the sort of position espoused by Aquinas are available, and that the attempt to put these materials to use is encouraged by the impasse in which the sixteenth-and seventeenth-century theories of natural law manifestly found themselves. The subsequent chapters of this book incorporate such an attempt.
... the reason for making the attempt is that a theory of practical reasonableness, of basic forms of human good, and of practical principles, such as the theory Aquinas adumbrated but left insufficiently elaborated, is untouched by the objections which Hume (and after him the whole Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment current of ethics) was able to raise against the tradition of rationalism eked out by voluntarism. 9 philosophical enquiry and argument, and is to make one little more than an apologist for doctrine and theology. But the assumption cannot be explicated or defended without resort, covert if not overt, to the premise that Catholicism is false. For if Catholicism is substantially true, then a Catholic scholar can pursue philosophical, scientific or historical inquiries and discussions with full freedom of mind-as many have done and do-confident that when pursued with such resolute freedom and diligence their findings and results will not conflict with Catholic doctrine and, where their subjectmatter overlaps with Catholic doctrine, will turn out to be clarified and, if possible, made more certain by the additional information conveyed by the divine revelation embodied in that doctrine. NLNR does not proclaim this, but tacitly proceeds on this basis.
NLNR, 46-7 (emphases added). The passage continues:
That tradition presented itself as the classical or central tradition of natural law theorizing, but in truth it was peculiar to late scholasticism. It was attractive to non-Catholics (like Grotius, Culverwel, and Clarke) who adopted its major concepts not least because of its strong verbal and conceptual resemblances to the Stoicism (XIII.1) so much admired in European culture from the Renaissance to the end of the eighteenth century. The substantive differences between the theory of natural law espoused by Vazquez and Suarez (and most Catholic manuals until the other day) and the theory espoused by Aquinas are scarcely less significant and extensive than the better-known differences between Aristotelian and Stoic ethics.
The section ends with a series of far-reaching critical remarks about ethical and meta-ethical positions characteristic of the period from 1630 to today, in which Aquinas is presented as the primary critic, and as one who quite obviously speaks for the book's author.
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NLNR thus defined itself as an attempt to develop Aquinas's theory, so as to give an account of natural law that is philosophically sound, untouched by Humean and all subsequent philosophical and cultural objections, and at the same timeto the extent permitted by philosophically critical criteria-is more authentically in line with St. Thomas's thought than were his most influential sixteenth-century commentators and followers.
The book's prominent statements"o that it is not deferring to the authority of Aquinas, or proceeding out of reverence for him (or of Catholic doctrine), are sincere and true. They are also rhetorically strategic, because countless readers will approach the book with the Protestant and secularist assumption that a Roman Catholic is a mental slave, and a Thomist abjectly so. The assumption is fallacious, a petitio principii, a vicious circle, in so far as it covertly or overtly assumes that Catholicism and Thomism are false or substantially erroneous. For that is the very question in issue in the work of Thomists.II If Thomism turns out to be substantially correct by the autonomous criteria of critical, free-thinking philosophy, a good working method in philosophizing is to start with Thomas's positions and test them as rigorously as one can against those autonomous criteria and against the most careful and stringent criticisms that one can find in the literature or devise in one's reflection.1 2 If the assumption of Thomists' mental servitude is to be held non-fallaciously, it must be accompanied by a willingness to consider the possibility that Thomist positions in philosophy are true, and are reachable by autonomous critical reflection; testing that possibility will then be a kind of joining in the enterprise of Thomists, albeit without the initial presumption that this investigation will be fruitful in attaining substantive philosophical truths about reality and value. Then, as investigation confirms the plausibility of Thomist positions, especially when considered not one by one but as a network, though always also against the evidence of experience, history and logic, one's initial presumption of Thomism's falsehood withers away and one can start to hold the contrary presumption that it is a generally sound guide to truthattaining positions in philosophy. So none of this need proceed fom reverence for Aquinas, or out ofdeference to his (or the Catholic Church's) authority. Hence the book's disclaimers, which are fully compatible with its method.
What is that method? As is easily noticed by careful readers, especially if they attend to the argument of chapter II and the endnotes to chapters III and IV (or subsequent chapters), the book treats its own theses as also Aquinas's (and vice versa) except when it specifically asserts some deficiency in the latter-a deficiency 10 See NLNR, vi, 46. 1" call persons "Thomists" if they regularly agree with positions of St. Thomas himself, and work with a presumption that Aquinas is much more likely to be sound than mistaken. Such a person would be well advised not to accord the same presumption to the works of other Thomists, still less to the works of neo-scholastics, many of whom adopted, consciously or not, philosophical positions at odds with Aquinas. I call positions "Thomist" if they are positions of Aquinas himself, taken as a coherent whole, not simply statement by statement; such a whole I call "Thomism".
12 The testing should not take positions in isolation, but as parts of a much wider network of Thomist positions, all of which are implicitly in issue in the testing of any one of them-for similarly, critical objections, though they sincerely and reasonably present themselves as particular, in fact presuppose a network of supportive presuppositions, all of which are thus implicitly in issue.
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204 or flaw that almost invariably is not error on his part but unclarity or some other form of incompleteness in the provision of premises. Such readersespecially those properly attentive to "the art of writing"-soon judge that the book is treating Aquinas's views as warranted (and true) save when it specifically says otherwise. Fortin's reading is faulty exegesis in so far as it sees only "numerous references to [Aquinas] in the text" [592]. Indeed, the lead-up to that remark is severely mistaken about all the four authors mentioned: "[Finnis's] own method of procedure is largely deductive in character and resembles that of Rawls and H.L.A. Hart more than it does that of Thomas Aquinas, despite numerous references to him in the text" [592].
In truth, the book scorns Rawls'sl 3 and Hart's' 4 methods (widely different from each other!) of dealing with the foundations of ethics (and thus of political and legal theory), especially for their theories about human good(s). It equally disdains the foundationless and unwarranted character of their principal theses in ethics, politics and jurisprudence.
Nor can the book's method of identifying basic human goods and the main requirements of practical reason be reasonably said to be deductive. It does not "lay down as self-evident" the basic pre-moral values (basic human goods), but resorts to a variety of encouragements to readers to re-enact for themselves, reflectively, the process-called by Aristotle, Aquinas and thus by the book inductive1 5 -by which they attained some insight into those basic goods. Every reader, 13 Against Rawls's method and theory: NLNR, 76 (the first sentence quotes Rawls, the second is a root-and-branch rejection of his foundational assumption and method); 82 (Rawls's "primary goods" are not basic human goods); 106 (we must not use Rawls's theory of "thin theory of the good" or his would-be "democratic" but in fact arbitrary "impartiality between differing conceptions of human good," his "radical emaciation of human good"); 109 (Rawls disregards the second requirement of practical reasonableness, and his basic position about selection of principles in the Original Position is made worthless by an elementary logical fallacy); 130 (ditto); 157 (Rawls's view of the "shared final end" of members of a society is mistaken); 163 (a theory of justice should not be restricted, as Rawls's is, to the basic institutions ofsociety); 164 (nor should a theory ofjustice be restricted, as Rawls's is, to a society whose members are fully compliant with the principles of justice); 293 (erroneous social engineering and social control theories of law are in the spirit of Rawls's "thin theory of the good"); and now 453 (the critiques on 108-9 go to the heart of A Theory offustice and should be extended to his Political Liberalism). Alongside these multiple rejections of Rawls's main views are three or four favorable references are to quite minor aspects of his theory and method. For my very considered but dismissive 1973 review of A Theory oflustice, see CEJF III, essay 3 (pp. 72-5).
14 Against Hart's ethical method and theory of "the minimum content of natural law": NLNR, 30-1 (against Hart's claim that "the good for man" is all debatable); 52-3 (against Hart's depiction of the teleological view of nature); 82 (against Hart's confusion between basic values and the material conditions for pursuing them, and against his reduction of basic goods to one, survival [and whose? of what?]); 163 (against Hart's restriction of the principles of justice to "treat like cases alike, different cases differently'); 227 (against Hart's preference for a "choice" theory of rights). Fortin included, certainly did once (good by good), when young, attain such insights, and also began to deploy them with more, or less, adequate coherence and integrity as-when thus taken in combination with each other and as goods realizable in the lives of others as well as oneself-morally as well as pragmatically significant guides to decision making. No one who seriously reflects upon the lines of thought developed at chapter length (chap. III) about the good of knowledge, and upon the argumentation (111.6) on the dialectical defensibility but radically basic character of our knowledge of that good's goodness, will call this a "laying down" of anything. The same goes for chapter IV's identification of other basic goods/values. And chapter V, like the rest of the book, plainly denies Fortin's claim that NLNR presents "the universal norms of private and public morality" as reached "by way of entailment" from the premoral basic values/ goods.' 6 For: between the basic goods and any norms of morality stand, as new premises, the "methodological requirements of practical reasonableness," attained by another but quite different kind of induction (or abduction).' 7 No deduction or entailments here, nor indeed much "quasi-mathematical rigor"
[593], meritorious or otherwise. Instead, an itemization of aspects of deliberation and choice that philosophers have reflectively identified as pre-eminently important elements of reasonableness in action.
II. The Governing Natural Virtues: Practical Reasonableness and Justice
As NLNR repeatedly indicates, its key term "practical reasonableness" is intended to be understood as the precise counterpart and translation of phronesis as that word appears in Plato and Aristotle, and of prudentia as used by Aquinas In the book, practical reasonableness is introduced as "the integrating good," the basic human good whose subject-matter or content is precisely the integration of the pursuit of any and all of the basic goods and corresponding practical principles. In the same breath, "the moral principles" are introduced as what are "involved in the pursuit" of this good of practical reasonableness.
1 8 This is the basic human good that makes nonsense of Fortin's claims that the book's "pivotal thesis concern[s] the fundamental equality of all basic values." Having misunderstood the book's thesis that the basic goods are "all equally fundamental," Fortin converts it into a denial that there is "any natural hierarchy of ends," and concludes:
"It follows that the life of a great scholar, statesman, or religious leader is not intrinsically superior to that of a music buff, a valetudinarian, or a ski bum
But valetudinarians, by definition, are unreasonably concerned about their own health, and necessarily neglect the good of practical reasonableness. Ski bums are bums because, for the good of play, they shamefully neglect all other basic human goods, instrumentalizing the good of association to their self-centered purpose, and in constant violation, therefore, of the good of practical reasonableness too. Fortin's interpretation of chapter IV.4's remarks about the senses in which there is no single hierarchy of value among the basic goods simply sets aside the truly "pivotal thesis" on the opening page of chapter V. Headed " The good ofpractical reasonableness structures our pursuit ofgoods," that page states first that the multiplicity of basic goods, none instrumental or simply subordinate to the others in value, leaves us all with the questions "What is to be done? What may be done? What is not to be done?" It states next that to be free and responsible is to have choices such as between concentrating on (say) one value and commitment to others. And then it explains this responsibility:
For among the basic forms of good that we have no reason to leave out of account is the good of practical reasonableness, which is participated in precisely by shaping one's 18 NLNR, 49. The book's first reference to it is at p. 23:
What are principles of natural law? The sense that the phrase 'natural law' has in this book can be indicated in the following rather bald assertions, formulations which will seem perhaps empty or question-begging until explicated in Part Two. There is (i) a set of basic practical principles which indicate the basic forms of human flourishing as goods to be pursued and realized, and which are in one way or another used by everyone who considers what to do, however unsound his conclusions; and (ii) a set of basic methodological requirements of practical reasonableness (itself one of the basic forms of human flourishing) which distinguish sound from unsound practical thinking and which, when all brought to bear, provide the criteria for distinguishing between acts that (always or in particular circumstances) are reasonable-all-things-considered (and not merely relative-to-a-particular purpose) and acts that are unreasonable-all-things-considered, i.e. between ways of acting that are morally right or morally wrong-thus enabling one to formulate (iii) a set of general moral standards.
(emphases added).
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participation in the other basic goods, by guiding one's commitments, one's selection of projects, and what one does in carrying them out.' 9 And this is the point at which the book reaches, and reaches into, morality:
The principles that express the general ends of human life do not acquire what would nowadays be called a "moral" force until they are brought to bear upon definite ranges of project, disposition, or action, or upon particular projects, dispositions, or actions. How they are thus to be brought to bear is the problem for practical reasonableness. "Ethics," as classically conceived, is simply a recollectively and/or prospectively reflective expression of this problem and of the general lines of solutions which have been thought reasonable.
How does one tell that a decision is practically reasonable? This question is the subject-matter of the present chapter. 2 0 Manifestly, then, the book treats the good of practical reasonableness as standing in a hierarchical relationship to all the other basic human goods. 2 ' The book denies that the hierarchy is one of value. It impliedly asserts that the hierarchy is one of significance for, that is, importance in, making choices and commitments of every kind of generality, specificity or particularity.
Fortin seems not to have noticed that moral significance or importance might derive from something other than simple superiority in pre-moral value. That that importance is derived from something other is one of the book's most pivotal theses. The deeper understanding of Aquinas's ethics that I gained in writing Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (1998) only confirmed that for Aquinas, too, the bonum rationis, the good of practical reasonableness, is pivotal. 2 2 This architectonic good is decisively important not because it ranks higher in goodness than life, knowledge, friendship, or love of God, but because of its inherent content: the goodness of pursuing intrinsic human goods in a reasonable way. And the classical synonym for that "in a reasonable way" is virtuously.
NLNR abstains, just as Fortin notices, from the classics' talk of virtue, virtues, and so forth. What he fails to notice is that the abstention is largely rhetorical, and that virtue dominates the book under another name, or pair of names. The first name is practical reasonableness. The equivalence of that with prudentia and phronesis is absolutely explicit, 2 3 and as Fortin well knew, prudentia is the supreme " [T] here is no objective hierarchy amongst them" (p. 92). This proposition... would better have been: there is "no single, objective hierarchy" [thus Fundamentals of Ethics (1983), 511. There are various hierarchies. Life is most necessary, as precondition for the others; transmission of life shares in that kind of necessity. As for practical reasonableness, its very intelligibility as a good is as being in charge of (and in that sense, above) the pursuit and realization of all the other basic goods. 24 and is the only virtue that is both an intellectual and a moral virtue. The other moral virtue to which the book gives elaborate attention (again, without using the word "virtue" or its cognates) is, of course, justice. In the classical schema of the cardinal virtues, it is next in strategic importance to prudentia. Fortin claimed that the book does not present justice as a virtue, that is, "as a disposition of the soul" [597]. But he was again entirely mistaken. According to NLNR (not to mention Aquinas), 2 5 all aspects of justice are particularizations of General Justice, and General Justice is defined as precisely a disposition of the soul; in the concluding, summarizing words of chapter VII.2:
"Justice, as a quality ofcharacter, is in its general sense always a practical willingness to favour and foster the common good of one's communities, and the theory of justice is, in all its parts, the theory of what in outline is required for that common good."
26
The next-following section of chapter VII proceeds to show that realizing the common good involves (i) problems of distributing resources, opportunities, burdens of cooperation, etc., to particular individuals, and a (ii) range of other problems not involving common enterprises and dangers but responsibilities of one individual to another, such as duties of carefulness, duties of performing undertakings, and duties of compensation, etc. The guiding thought is that mere disposition to favor common good, in any of these ways, is not enough. Justice, as Aquinas observes, is not like courage and temperance, cardinal virtues measured by practical reasonableness's constitutional rule over passions of aversion and desire. 2 7 Justice is about the right external action (or forbearance) in relation to other people, and justice is done even when it is done without good dispositions. So the measure of the virtue of justice is the right proportionality between one's actions (or abstentions) and the rights of the other; dispositions (the material of virtues) take second place in working out the theory of justice, and rightly Aquinas make no further appearance in NLNR's chapter on justice after the definition quoted above.
Quite generally, the problems of individual and communal moral life are not solved by talk about virtues. NLNRs terse explanation of its abstention from talk about virtue and virtues is on the page immediately following the page (just quoted from above) defining "Ethics" and the "'moral' force" of the basic goods or general ends of human life. The explanation is implicit in the following:
How does one tell that a decision is practically reasonable? This question is the subjectmatter of the present chapter. The classical exponents of ethics (and of theories of natural law) were well aware of this problem of criteria and standards of judgment. They emphasize that an adequate response to that problem can be made only by one who has experience (both of human wants and passions and of the conditions of human life) and intelligence and a desire for reasonableness stronger than the desires that might overwhelm it.
28
I interrupt to note Fortin's assertion that in NLNR "practical reasonableness . . . does not appear to be connected in any way with the inclinations of the appetite or dependent on them for the rectitude of its judgment" [597]. The lines just quoted contradict him, as is confirmed a few lines later when I say (about two specifically Aristotelean and Thomist articulations of the general interrelationship between right judgment and good character) "Such assertions can scarcely be denied." 29 But, as I go on to state, they are scarcely helpful to those who are wondering whether their own view of what is to be done is a reasonable view or not. The notion of "the mean".. . seems likewise to be accurate but not very helpful.... For what is "the mean and best, which is characteristic of virtue"? It is "to feel [anger, pity, appetite, etc.] when one ought to, and in relation to the objects and persons one ought to, and with the motives and in the manner that one ought to..." Have we no more determinate guide than this?
In the two millennia since Plato and Aristotle initiated formal inquiry into the content of practical reasonableness, philosophical reflection has identified a considerable number of requirements of method in practical reasoning. Each of these requirements has, indeed, been treated by some philosophers with exaggerated respect, as if it were the exclusive controlling and shaping requirement. For, as with the basic forms of good, each of these requirements is fundamental, underived, irreducible, and hence is capable when focused upon of seeming the most important.
Each of these requirements concerns what one must do, or think, or be if one is to participate in the basic value of practical reasonableness. Someone who lives up to these 28 NLNR, 101.
29 NLNR, 102. That the book associates itself with "the classical exponents of ethics" in their concern about experience of passions (and an inclination to practical reasonableness stronger than competing passions) is clear also from the endnote to that passage, at p. 128:
Elaboration of moral principles, and particular moral decisions, both require wisdom that is far from universal.... see, e.g., S. T I-II q. 100 aa. 1, 3, 11; this wisdom is prudentia (S.T II-II q. 47 a. 2c ad 1; aa. 6, 15; and notes to 11.3 above). On the folly of the many see S. T I-II q. 9 a. 5 ad 3; q. 14 a. 1 ad 3. On the corruption of practical reasonableness in various cultures and people(s), see S. T I q. 113 a. 1; I-Il q. 58 a. 5; q. 94 a. 4; q. 99 a. 2 ad 2; and 11.3 above, and 225 n. 28 below.
requirements is thuS 30 Aristotle's phronimos and has Aquinas's prudentia; they are requirements of reasonableness or practical wisdom, and to fail to live up to them is irrational. 3 1
The paragraph and section proceed for another couple of dozen lines, explaining why the resultant of these requirements is eudaimonia, that is, flourishing, and why these requirements of moral goodness are thus also requirements for fulfilling one's nature and of "natural law." NLNRs undertaking to its readers, in short, is to provide something more helpful as a guide to conscientious decision-making in individual and social life than a mere naming of relevant virtues and counseling a life of virtue, with reason ruling the passions but (as Fortin would have it) with rectitude of rational judgment dependent on "the inclinations of the appetite" 3 2 -advice easy enough to give but not much help to anyone, above all in the fields of social life and thus of justice (the book's fields).
In the 2011 Postscript to NLNR, there is a short preliminary section headed Virtues and Principles:
The book says little about virtue(s). That was deliberate, but it would have been appropriate to explain both the decision and the intrinsic relationship between virtues and principles, the priority of the latter, and the bearing of free choices' intransitive aspects (their lasting in the dispositions of the chooser) on the formation of virtues and vices. Aquinas, 124, explains why principles, propositional practical truths, are more fundamental than virtues, even than the master virtue of practical reasonableness (prudentia): 'for virtues are the various aspects of a stable and ready willingness to make good choices, and like everything in the will, are a response to reasons, and reasons are propositional'. 33 And the relevant propositions are the first principles of practical reason(ing) (Chapters III and IV above) and the requirements of practical reasonableness (Chapter V), together with the more specific moral norms which result from bringing these two levels of principle to bear on one another. Some of this is hinted at in the paragraph on p. 102 above concerning Aristotle's idea of the 'mean' (virtue's mean between the vices of 'too much' and 'too little'-where reasons are the measure of the excessive and the fitting). But spelling out the inherent connection between principles and virtue(s), the logical and rational primacy of the former (a primacy acknowledged by Aquinas), 34 and the grounds on which, nonetheless, Aquinas could judge it reasonable to arrange his largest discussion of morality under the various cardinal virtues, would have helped avoid the suspicion that 'virtue ethics' was or is an unexamined alternative to the kind of moral theory deployed in this book. It is not.
35
That was said at large. But let me revert to Fortin's criticism, already adumbrated, that in NLNR "the soul, its passions, and the reordering of those passions do not enter into account. Human beings may remain as they are as long as the institutions under which they live are as they ought to be" [397]. That is contradicted by 30 Note the equivalence indicated between the three terms by this "thus." 31 NLNR, 102, emphases adjusted. 32 Fortin, 597. 33 Finnis, Aquinas, 124; see also ibid., 187-8. 34 Aquinas, 124 nn.103, 104.
NLNR, 421-2.
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J Finnis a passage which various readers have found pungent, pertinent, and suggestive of wider issues touching the soul and the ordering of its passions:
The fact is that human rights can only be securely enjoyed in certain sorts of milieu-a context or framework of mutual respect and trust and common understanding.... Consider, now, the concept of public morality, in its oddly restricted [conventional], sexual sense.... If it is the case that sexuality is a powerful force which only with some difficulty, and always precariously, can be integrated with other aspects of human personality and well-being-so that it enhances rather than destroys friendship and the care of children, for example; and if it is further the case that human sexual psychology has a bias towards regarding other persons as bodily objects of desire and potential sexual release and gratification... then there is reason for fostering a milieu in which children can be brought up (and parents assisted rather than hindered in bringing them up) so that they are relatively free from inward subjection to an egoistic, impulsive, or depersonalized sexuality. Just what such a milieu concretely amounts to and requires for its maintenance is something that is matter for discussion and decision, elsewhere. But that this is an aspect of the common good, and fit matter for laws which limit the boundless exercise of certain rights, can hardly be doubted by anyone who attends to the facts of human psychology as they bear on the realization of basic human goods. 3 6 The passage makes clear that the "milieu" or matrix in which human goods can be realized, harmed or destroyed includes the inner life, "psychology" in the sense that it can be affected for good or ill by cultural/educational encouragement to or discouragement from the self-discipline and virtue needed to integrate passions with reason and reasonable relationships, and so forth.
Fortin says that, in NLNR, "human beings may remain as they are." But the book's central section, on the specification of rights (to which I shall return below), states that
[t]here is, I think, no alternative but to hold in one's mind's eye some pattern, or range of patterns, of human character ... and then to choose such specification of rights as tends to favour that.. .. One attends not merely to character types desirable in the abstract ... So one will bear in mind... that... friendship and respect for human personality really are threatened by hatred, group bias, and anarchic sexuality... that servility, infantilism, and hypocrisy really are evils... that where 'paternalism' on the part of the political community is justified it is ... to be no more than a help to self-correction. 37 The passage, which in the temper of the age is much more noticeable to the book's average and likely readers than to Fr Fortin, 3 8 shows how questionable not only is 36 NLNR, 216-7 (emphases added).
NLNR, 220 (emphasis added).
38 The paragraph begins with overt challenges to the demotic egalitarianism and vulgar disdain for nobility and virtue that Fortin finds pervasive in the book: So one will bear in mind, on the one hand, that art.... really is better than trash, that culture really is better than ignorance, that.... children really do benefit from a formation that defines paths as well as illuminating horizons. NLNR, 220. This for many readers will have recalled the provocation and ironizing offered at the outset of the book's discussion of distributive justice: the objective of justice is not equality but the common good, the flourishing of all members of the community, and there is no reason to suppose that this flourishing of all is enhanced by his remark about people remaining as they are, but also another set of assessments he makes, presenting the book as "prescinding altogether, as Kant had done, from the distinction between base or selfish and noble or unselfish impulses," and as treating moral virtue as dispensable [596]. In the end, Fortin's presentation of my position ascends to fantasy:
One need not acquire [courage, moderation, and the other moral virtues] in order to enjoy their benefits. Justice is always to my immediate or long-range advantage and the just life is the most pleasant life. At the extreme limit, no one has to worry about ever having to sacrifice himself for the common good.
[596].
The real-world NLNR, however, begins and ends its long discussion of the common good with prominent reminders of the moral necessity, sometimes ineluctable, of self-sacrifice:
does not the analysis of morality as reasonableness in self-constitution overlook the fact that moral responsibilities can require one to sacrifice not merely one's selfishness, and one's self-interest, but even, on occasion, oneself?
This chapter undertakes a fuller analysis of the proper relationship between one's own well-being and the well-being of others. It does not complete that analysis... . The question just raised, about the reasonableness of self-sacrifice, and the related question whether the effort to be reasonable is in the end just a pursuit of self-perfection, are questions to be tackled and resolved only in Chapter XIII. 39 When the issue is resumed, as promised, at the outset of chapter XIII, it is framed as arising both in the context both of friendship, when my friend's well-being "can be secured only by my ruin or destruction," and in the context of responsibilities to family or political community, responsibilities which "reasonably may require self-sacrifice." 4 0 The question is kept in view. 41 The curious inadequacy of Aristotle's attempt to "explain the reasonableness of self-sacrifice for one's friend" is recalled. 4 2 The book's explanation "in principle" of "how self-sacrifice in friendship can make sense," along with "our obligation to favour the common good," is finally pointed to in a (very reserved) discussion of divine revelation, first as holding out a divine friend whose favor for the good of one's friends and neighbors "is given knowing fully the true worth and all-explaining point of everything, treating everyone identically when distributing roles, opportunities, and resources. Thus... what is unjust about large disparities of wealth in a community is not the inequality as such but the fact that (as the inequality suggests) the rich have failed to redistribute that portion of their wealth which could be better used by others for the realization of basic values in their own lives. If redistribution means no more than that more beer is going to be consumed morosely before television sets by the relatively many, and less fine wine consumed by the relatively few at salon concerts by select musicians, then it can scarcely be said to be a demand of justice. But if redistribution means that, at the expense of the wine, etc., more people can be preserved from (non-self-inflicted) illness, educated to the point where genuine self-direction becomes possible for them, defended against the enemies of justice, etc., then such redistribution is a requirement of justice. In such a "final analysis," in which we seek an understanding going beyond our feelings, the "serious things of life," even atrocious miseries, are really serious only to the extent that they contribute to or are caught up into a good play of the game of the God who creates and favors human good.1 5
NLNR,
Fortin like everyone else would be fully entitled to say that the book's attempt to make full sense of self-sacrifice is of very limited success-or even to try to argue that it simply fails. He was not entitled to suggest that the book in any way teaches that "the just life is the most pleasant life. ... no one has to worry about ever having to sacrifice himself for the common good." 4 6 III. Rights, their Logic, and Virtue
The main thesis of Fortin's review is articulated in its motto, the "little ditty my gang used to sing when I was a kid": I love Carolina, I love Angelina, too, I can't marry both, So what I gonna do?
His point: one "can't marry both" "rights or freedom on the one hand, and .. .virtue, character formation, and the common good on the other." 4 7 He was fundamentally mistaken, I believe, in his tying of rights to feedom-worse, to Hobbesian freedom from duty-and fundamentally mistaken in contrasting respect for rights (and claims of rights) with virtue, character-formation, common good and natural law (or natural right). One can, and every society and social, political or moral theory should, marry both, for love. And this is not polygamy, 46 Having made the suggestion (596), Fortin then quotes (596-7) from some of the passages that refute it. But he leaves the suggestion in place and compounds it by insinuating that, in NLNR, "virtue is not choiceworthy for its own sake" (597). But of course, practical reasonableness, the very source of virtue, is a basic human good, choiceworthy for its own sake like all basic human goods and unlike the others in that it has all of them, and one's participation in them, as precisely its subjectmatter. Still, footnote 11 shows Fortin worrying away at the matter, as one should. J Finnis for they are not two distinct realities but two aspects of-two ways of talking about-one and the same fruitful object of reasonable love and devotion.
The corresponding Straussian bifurcation of history, too, is mistaken, and it pervades Fortin's review. 4 8 NLNR rejects the mistake, but not clearly enough. Its discussion should have attended more closely to the Roman-law definition of justice that St. Thomas adopted for his vast treatise on justice, 4 9 and to his decision to head up that treatise with a whole article on ius.
5 0 For the most correct English translation of that article's subject-matter (ius) is "rights," plural (even though the Latin word is singular). The object of the virtue of justice, and of acts of justice, is rights-in the central sense of that English term, the sense in which its correlative is duties, that is, duties of justice resulting from the directives of natural and, where pertinent, just positive law. These facts, which I believe to be beyond dispute, render the contrasts alleged (albeit variously) by Leo Strauss, Michel Villey and Ernest Fortin simply untenable, both historically and philosophically. It is deeply regrettable that so much scholarly time has been diverted to tracing differences that are in the last analysis almost imaginary.
The mistake takes a particularly muddled form in Fortin's review, because it misunderstands the basic logic of the correlativity of rights (to be treated justly) and duties (of justice)-a correlativity with which Aquinas was working throughout his treatise on justice, and which I spell out in a formally complete way at the beginning of NLNRs chapter on rights. Here is Fortin on that correlativity:
No one [according to NLNR] has any real duties other than those entailed by the requirements of practical reasonableness 51 or the need to protect the rights with which he was already gifted prior to his incorporation into civil society. 52 At most, the central issue of the relation of rights to duties remains blurred [in NLNR] and the section that deals with it thematically (pp. 205-10) does little to remove the ambiguity. Nonetheless, I profited from the book, especially its chapter IV, "Classic Natural Right," as the markings and annotations to my 1969 copy of it indicate. To take just one example: on p. 127, I marked the passage beginning: "the proper work of man consists in living thoughtfully, in understanding, and in thoughtful action." But NLNR accepts that it cannot presume that human beings have a "proper work," but rather shows this by displaying the good of practical reasonableness, and its intrinsic subject-matter, i.e., the direction of action as a pursuit of this and other basic goods realizable in the life of the acting person and of others-and so forth.
49 S.T q. 58 a. Ic (justice's fitting definition: "the lasting and steady willingness to give to each his/ her right(s)"). 50 S. T II-II q. 57 a. 1 (justice's object: ius). On all this, see my Aquinas, 133-4. 51 Quite so; practical reasonableness is nothing other than my translation of prudentia, the master moral and intellectual virtue, which cannot be found independently of justice (not to mention courage and temperance). It is inconceivable, for St. Thomas as for NLNR, that there could be moral or legal duties not required by the virtue and insights of prudentia. 52 Aquinas's way of referring to duties owed to-and therefore, by entailment, rights possessed bypersons whether or not they have the benefit of living in civil society is to say that there are important respects in which justice is owed to everyone alike (indifferenter) rather than to particular persons or classes of person for reasons particular to them (ex aliqua speciali ratione): see Aquinas, 136. this still leaves open the question as to which of the two is the fundamental moral fact.
[
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The blurring, like the "leaving open the question," is in Fortin's eye, and has as its direct cause his misunderstanding of the correlativity of rights and duties. 56 Everything NLNR says about rights has as its basis the virtue of justice, which is why its chapter on justice (as Fortin fails to note) precedes the chapter on rights. This makes NLNRs treatment of the "fundamental moral fact" question (rights? or duties?) not blurred but rather transparent:
In short, the modern vocabulary and grammar of rights is a many-faceted instrument for reporting and asserting the requirements or other implications of a relationship of justice from the point of view of the person(s) who benefit(s) from that relationship. It provides a way of talking about "what is just" from a special angle: the viewpoint of the 53 He never noticed or shook free from this large mistake. Thus in his most thorough treatment of the issue and the scholarly literature (especially Michel Villey, Richard Tuck and Brian Tierney)-Fortin says:
Granted, one cannot conclude from the absence of any explicit distinction between objective and subjective right in their works that the classical philosophers and their medieval disciples would have objected to the notion of subjective rights.... Since rights are already implied in the notion of duty-anyone who has a duty to do something must have the right to do it-there appears to be no reason to dichotomize them. What they represent would be nothing more than two sides of a single coin. If, as was generally assumed in the Middle Ages, there is such a thing as the natural law, one has every reason to speak of the rights to which it gives rise as being themselves natural. What once presented itself as first and foremost a doctrine of duties and hence of virtue or dedication to the common good of one's society now takes its bearings, not from what human beings owe to their fellow human beings, but from what they can claim for themselves.. . . duties are [in modern ethical theory] rooted in pre-existing rights which everyone is obliged in conscience to honor and which must , therefore, be regarded as the primary moral phenomenon.
At first glance, the difference between the two views might be looked upon as one of approach rather than of genuine substance, and the more so as rights and duties are to some extent correlative. Iflhave a duty to do something, I must also have the right to do it, though the converse need not be true. (emphasis added) 5 In the Hohfeldian terminology adopted and explained carefully on NLNR, 199-200, this kind of right-the most fundamental kind-is a claim right: a claim on A that he shall do or forbear in relation to B in some specific respect.
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The confused interest in this trivial liberty is not original to Fortin; it is to be found in a continental neo-scholastic tradition.
56 S. T II-II q. 57 a.1c, q. 58 aa. Ic, 2c, q. 80 a. un. c.; NLNR, 161-2. "other(s)" to whom something (including, inter alia, freedom of choice) is owed or due, and who would be wronged if denied that something. And the contemporary debate shows that there is a strong though not irresistible tendency to specialize that viewpoint still further, so that the peculiar advantage implied (on any view) by any ascription of rights is taken to be the advantage of freedom of action, and/or power to affect the freedom of action of others.... ... there is no cause to take sides as between the older and the newer usages, as ways of expressing the implications of justice in a given context. Still less is it appropriate to argue that "as a matter of juristic logic" duty is logically prior to right (or vice versa). But when we come to explain the requirements of justice, which we do by referring to the needs of the common good at its various levels, then we find that there is reason for treating the concept of duty, obligation, or requirement as having a more strategic explanatory role than the concept of rights. The concept of rights is not on that account of less importance or dignity: for the common good is precisely the good of the individuals whose benefit, from fulfilment of duty by others, is their right because required in justice of those others.
As I put it, more tersely but to the same effect, in Aquinas:
In Aquinas' understanding of justice, rights are as fundamental as duties, and duties as fundamental as rights. We have duties which are not duties of justice, so duty is the wider concept. But when a duty is to another human person, it is a duty of justice, and that other person's right is its very object or point.
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Fortin's blunder about the elementary logic of rights and duties is surely a prime source of his mistakes about the history of the rights tradition. For he sees the origin of that tradition in Hobbes. 5 To the best of my knowledge, the true originator of the rights doctrine is Hobbes, from whom it was taken over by virtually all of the great early modern thinkers, Spinoza, Locke, and Rousseau foremost among them. That doctrine emerged by way of a reaction against premodern thought and signals a radical departure from it.... Its underlying premise is that, contrary to what had been previously assumed, human beings are not intrinsically ordered to a natural end, in the attainment of which they find their happiness or perfection. In Hobbes' own words, "there is no such finis ultimus, utmost aim, nor summum bonum, greatest good, as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers.' Human beings are universally actuated, not by a desire for the good of reason, but by an amoral passion, and not the most noble one at that; to wit, the fear of violent death, which constitutes the sole foundation on which a viable theory of justice can be erected. (emphasis added)
In NLNR, and for St. Thomas, human beings naturally understand the "good of reason," that is, the good of practical reasonableness, and beyond the fear of violent death they naturally understand 
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the juridical relationship which is fixed by law (moral or posited) and which establishes jus in Aquinas's sense: "that which is just." 59 For within a few years Hobbes is writing:
... jus, and lex, right and law... ought to be distinguished; because right, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas law, determineth and bindeth to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent. 60 Pushed as far as Hobbes's purposes, this contrast between law and rights deprives the notion of rights of virtually all its normative significance. Hobbes wishes to say that one has most rights when one is in the "state of nature," i.e. a vacuum of law and obligation, since "in such a condition, every man has a right to everything; even to one another's body."' 6 ' But we could just as well say that in such a condition of things, where no persons have any duty not to take anything they want, no one has any rights.
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In other words, Hobbes's theory of rights is rationally ineligible, an outrageous muddle: the state of nature is a condition in which there are not only no legal rights but also no human or natural rights. Hobbes's confused prioritizing of bare liberty, unprotected by any claim-rights, had some influence on other voluntarist thinkers such as Locke and Pufendorf. But their deployment of a partially Hobbesian, liberty-prioritizing logic of rights was watered down by their simultaneous, partly incoherent, but real adherence to main elements of the classical and Christian conception of rights: as correlatives of duties defined by the same natural law as provides the propositional content of the arduous virtues of ... the discussion of the history of the word 'jus' in the present section fails to notice how Aquinas's definition of justice, and his prior identification of jus as the very object (proximate goal and rationale) of justice, entail that-though it does not clearly appear from his formal account of the senses of 'ju'-in his view, jus (a right) is something that belongs to the subjects of law or moral relationships, and therefore has the essential characteristic of a subjective right. This being so, the 'watershed' spoken of in the first full paragraph on p. 206 must be regarded as much more a matter of appearance and idiom than of conceptual, let alone political or philosophical, substance. Evidence for this conclusion is in prudentia and justice. Hobbes cannot conceivably be the originator of the modern sense of rights, as one finds them stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 or any of its countless derivatives and antecedents.
Since the matter is so important for an understanding of political thought, old and current-not least Catholic political thought-it is worth going through Fortin's summary of his position, 6 3 commenting briefly by interjection into the continuous passage setting it out:
It is significant that the notion of universal human rights, understood as rights that inhere in each human being by reason of the fact that he or she is a human being, does not occur anywhere in premodern thought and, until very recent times, only sparingly in Roman Catholic thought.
Not so. Just as a notion of the Trinity occurs in the New Testament 6 4 without the term "Trinity" or any verbal equivalent, so the notion of universal human rights has been present in "pre-modern" and "Roman Catholic" thought, expressed in statements to the effect that all human beings are protected by the duties of justice, duties that are owed to, for example, the new-born child who might by custom be left to die on the mountainside, or the servant-girl or -boy who might by custom be taken for sex, or the passing stranger who might by some custom be robbed at least of his luxury goods. 6 5 The Bible itself, which shares to some degree the perspective of classical philosophy on this point, does not promulgate a Bill of Rights, of which it knows nothing; instead, it issues a set of commandments.
Yes, and these are the precepts of which Aquinas says (i) that they apply to every human being alike (communiter omnibus and indifferenter6 6 or inquantum est homo 6 7 ), and (ii) that, being precepts of justice, they have as their very object the rights of those-everyone-to whom justice is owed.68
For centuries, the corner-stone of Catholic moral theology was not the natural or human rights doctrine but something quite different, called the natural law.
No: natural law, like the set of duties it picks out and directs us to-not least but not exclusively duties to others with corresponding rights-remains the cornerstone of Catholic moral theology. The fact that that theology is now articulated in terms of rights as well as duties changes its propositional content not at all, but (when rightly understood) clarifies both its bases and its implications. Natural law stands to natural rights, not as something "quite different," but as premises stand to entailments.
Rights, to the extent that they were mentioned at least by implication, were contingent on the fulfillment of prior duties.
Not true. It is the repeated teaching of St. Thomas, with no sense of innovation, that children incapable of fulfilling prior duties had rights, including rights against their parents, who wronged them-implicitly, violated their rights-when they violated parental duties of care and respect, and the child's entitlement not to be obliged to do wicked things and to make his or her own choice of life-vocation and spouse. 6 9 Far from being absolute or inalienable, they could be forfeited and were so forfeited by the individual who failed to abide by the law that guaranteed them.
The rights that are truly absolute today were absolute, and for the most part clearly recognized as absolute, in classical Christian doctrine and theology. Fortin errs fundamentally when he says that "the rights whose defense [NLNR] takes up are still perceived as absolute or unconditional rights" [596] and speaks of "Finnis's teaching regarding the absolute inviolability of all basic human rights." [604] .70 The term "basic rights" did not appear in the book Fortin was reviewing, and the rights which NLNR defends as natural include many that cannot sensibly be called absolute but rather are contingent, for their specification (their specific application), on other changeable aspects of the common good of the communities in which respect for them comes in issue. 7 1 The absolute rights that NLNR proposes and defends in the short section entitled "Absolute Human Rights," at the end of the chapter on rights, are few in number (though of strategic significance for law, politics and individual life).
Finally, then, the passage I have been quoting from Fortin concludes:
Simply stated, what the church taught and tried to inculcate was an ethic of virtue as distinct from an ethic of rights.
But although the Church was not unreasonably hesitant to adopt an idiom that had been so prominently abused by bitterly anti-Catholic and philosophically (and theologically) very confused thinkers, such as Hobbes and Locke and the swarm of revolutionary propagandists who promulgated the "rights of man and citizen," it was never the case that an ethic of virtue need be in any way, even slightly, opposed to a reasonable ethic of rights. For it is as true now as it was in Aristotle's time 72 positive law, and human positive law (not to mention the eternal law of Providence) are, each in its own significantly differing way, law. No need to dwell on this part of Fortin's review, which runs into the sands, as he virtually admits when trying to account for the absence of natural law from the Summa contra Gentiles. St. Thomas holds what St. Paul holds in Romans 2: 12-16: that even those human beings who have never heard, or heard of, the divine law, or of God, can know "by nature" what the divine law requires; what they know is precisely the natural law, which accuses them in their consciences when they violate it, even though they are unaware that God too will in due time accuse them of such violations. Yes, revelation discloses that the natural law is upheld by divine sanctions (and corresponds in its content to much of the divine law), but the sanctions (and the overlap with divine law) are not what make it law or binding. 8 3 In a curious aftermath of the review of NLNR, Fortin and Edward Goerner engaged in an exchange "on the naturalness and lawfulness of the natural law." Goerner's views on Aquinas were even more skewed than Fortin's were by Straussian misreadings: he saw Aquinas as a practicer of veiled, esoteric writing to conceal and convey an elitist conception of morality as comprising unnuanced norms (of law, lex) for the many but nuanced, equitable norms (of right, ius) for the few-so that "Thomas's moral and political doctrine is not fundamentally a natural law teaching at all, and that in his teaching the morality of natural law is crucially different from (and subordinate to) the morality of natural virtue." 8 4 He also shared Fortin's mistakes 8 5 about the necessarily sanctioned character of (Aquinas's) natural law, which according to him "leads men to obedience by fear of punishment." 8 6 But the point is that the debate between them elicited from Fortin the statement or admission that he himself had no natural law
